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Abstract
It is assumed that first ring members bid in a preauction or knockout and that then only
the ring's representative repeats his bid in the subsequent main auction. The rules must
specify for every vector of bids who represents the caztel in the main auction, which
transfers he has to pay to other ring members to compensate them for abstaining from
bidding in the main auction, who wins the main auction, and finally which price has to be
paid. Most of the rules can be derived instead of being imposed by requiring envy-free net
trades with respect to bids. Although they could be uniquely determined by an additional
incentive constraint, we analyze all envy-free auction mechanisms with constant weights
by examining whether they aze profitable, i.e. every type of every caztel member gains
from ring formation, and coalition proof.
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1 Introduction
Auctions and public tenders account for many economic trade activities of indivisible commodi-
ties. Whereas in an auction buyers compete for buying one or several units oí a well specified
commodity, potential sellers compete for delivery in a public tender. Fspecially, in the public
sector all major investments are organised in the form of public tenders and their rules are
uften legally specilied (sce, for instance, Gandenberger, 19G1, who reports on tules o[ public
tenders in the early 16th century). Since all theoretical results for auctions can be transformed
in analogous atatements for public tendera juat by exchanging the two sidea of the mazket, we
can, without loss ofgenerality, restrict our attention to auctiona. For the sake of simplicity we,
furthermore, assume that there is one single object to be auctioned (see Guth, 1986, for the
obvious generalisation of auction rules i[ more than one unit of Uie same product ia offered for
sale).
A ring in an auction is a subset of the set of all bidders which agreed to submit only
one essential bid, namely the bid of tlie designated winner. Of course, this bid might liave
to compete with the bids of non-ring members. It might, furthermore, Lave to exceed the
reservation bid of the seller. t[ere it is assumed that the seller announces Lis reservation
bid before the auction wbich seems to be the usual procedure (Graham and Marshall, 1987,
explore difTerent rules). In the case of two bidders the ring does not have to face bids by
non-ring membets.'Actually this is the main complication when going from the two bidders to
"ring games" where the ring has to compete with the highest bid ot non-ring members whose
value is determined by a given distribution.
Out approach assumes that first ring members run a preauction to determine the designated
representative of the ring who has to repeat his bid in the following main auction whereas all
olher ring membcrs abstain from bidding or bidding above the seller's reservation valuc. TLus
all bidders submit unly one (essential) bid, namcly ring members in the preauction and non-ring
members in the main auction. IIy imposing the axiom of envyfreeness with respect to bids,
i.e. according to his bid no player prefers another's net trade to his own one, we derive the
following rules: The designated representative is the highest bidder in the preauction and the
auction winner is the highest bidder in the main auction. The price of the main auction has
to be in the iuterval between the second highest and the highest bid in the main auction. The
designated representative must equally distribute a.mong all ring members an amount between
what the second bidder in the preauction would have earned in the main auction if this is
non-negative, and what he Limselfearns in the main auction.
The axiom oC independent weights then implies that the sales price of the main auction is a
convex combination of the highest and second highest bid in the main anction and, similarly,
that the transfer payment is a convex combinalion o( what the highest and the second highest
bidder in the preauction would óaveearned in the main auction. Thus all mechanisms satisfying
the two axioms can be described as points (a,p) in the unit square where a defines the pricing
rule in the main auction, similarly to Guth and Van Damme (1986), whereas p defines the
transfer payments of the designated winner to all ring members.
It is shown that none of tl~e possible a,p-mechanisms is incentive compatible and that only
one satisfies underbidding proo(ness, i.e. every strategy whicó prescribes underbiddíng the own
true value is dominated. For the case o[ independent and identically distributed true values
and two bidders, who form a ring, we derive explicitly the unique symmetric equilibrium in
monotonic and ditierentiable strategies which always is coalition proof, i.e. no other ring conld
improve upon this result.
The case of more than two bidders is analysed in tlie ïorm of "ring games". In a ring game2
the winning bid in the main auction can be either the highest bid of all non-ring members or
the highest bid in the preauction. We distinguish simple ring games where the highest bid
of all non-ring members becomes common knowledge before the preauction. In complex ring
gamea this value is not known when deciding in the preauction, and all ring members expect
it to be chosen according to the same diatribution. In other worda: In simple ring games tlcis
distribution is the Dirac measure whereas the distribution is more widely spread in complex
ring games.
The incentives which different a-pricing rules imply for ring formation Lave been previously
analyaed (see Fehl and Guth, 198T, Graham and Marahall, 1987, as well as Graham, Marshall
and Richard, 1987). Felcl and Guth assume that a ring in an auction has been formed and
chosen a designated winner who ahould earn a given positive profit. Such a plan can, however,
be upset first by deviating ring members as well as by non-ring members. Fehl ancl Guth speak
of low internal ring stability if there are strong incentives, i.e. high gains, for deviating ring
members. Internal cartel stability has also been discussed by Robinson (1985). External ring
stability is low if due to cartel outsiders the prospects of ring formation are minor, i.e. tlie
designated winner of the ring will only relatively seldom make the deal in case of ring outsiders.
In a very elementary way Fehl and Guth (1987) can show that tlie second highest bid pricing
rule yields both, internally and externally, more stable cartel agreements tlian the highest bid
pricing rule. So, in their view, one fa,ces a trade off between destabilising rings and incentive
compatibility when deciding about the pricing rule. Bolle and Guth (1992) demonstrate that,
as on usual oligopoly markets, joint ownership avoids the problems of ring formation while
still maintaining cooperative market resulta. Here joint ownership means that owners of the
bidding firms hold shares o[ more than just one competing firm.
The analysis of collusive bidder behavior in auctions by Graham and Marshall (1987) as
well as by Graham, Marshall and Richard (1987) is more closely related to ours since these
authors also derive the behavior of all ring members instead of assuming some exogenously
given agreement. On the other hand these studies are, however, much more special since
they focus on special pricing and transfer rules, i.e. on a specific (a,p)-constellation in the
unit square. More specifically, Graham and Marshall (1987) design an ingenious, incentive
compatible mechanism according to which ring membera in the preauction and bidders in tl~e
main auction can bid truthfully. But to avoid our non-existence tlieorem they have to pay a
- in our view prohibitively high - price, namely the invention of an artificial institution which
they call nring center". This ring center makes lump sum payments to ring members and
collects payments írom the ring's representative in the main auction if he wins. Because of tliis
the second highest bid pricing rule in the preairetion as well as in the main auction are botL
incentive compatible, i.e. for all bidders truthful bidding is optimal regardless what tlie otliers
do. The ring center itself is not modelled as a player, it only serves as a clea.ring institution
which collects and distributes money within the ring.
Although we acknowledge that the institution of a ring ceuter is an ingenius idea, one
hardly can imagine how such an institution should be or can be implemented. From onr
analysis it also (ollows tlcat the pricing rule, on wlcich Graham and Ivfarshall (1987) rely, is
the most vuLierable one with respect to coalition proofness. So it inspires attempts to ofiset
the agreement by forming subrings. In our view, Graham and Marsha.ll were more interestecl
in inventing incentive compatible mechanisms than in exploring the obvious possibilities of
coalition proof rings for the obvious pricing and transfer rules.
The problem, studied by Graham et al. (1987), is how a ring wliich won the item in an
auction allocates it among its members via secondary auctions called "knockouts". Instead of
allowing only one knockout they, furthermore, assume a nested subring structure, i.e. within3
the initial ring there is a smaller subring for which a smaller subsubring exists, etc. A subring
always chooses a representative to be its only bidder in the knockout against the membera
of the larger subring, who are not in the smaller subring, and the winner of this knockout
will represent again the larger subring in the subsequent knockout against the members of the
even larger subring who are not contained in the pteviously mentioned subrings. Similarly to
Graham and Marshall (1987) all subsequent knockouts determined by the nested ring structure
are second highest bid price auctions.
The idea of nested rings which determine their representations in larger rings by subsequent
knockouta in the form of second highest bid price auctione is interesting although the etylized
fact 7 of Graham et af. (1987) seems to be a very weak support. The authors suggest a rather
detailed list of stylized Cacts (see also Graham and Marshall, 1987) without providing any
evidence or references. Since Graham et al. rely on knockouts in the fonn of second highest
bid price auctions, the arguments used in our discussion of Graham and Marshall (1987), apply
also to their study.
McAfee and McMillan (1992) analyse ring formation in auclions írom a welfare economic
point o[ view. Specifically, they first restrict tliemselves to incentive compatible direct mech-
anisms, for which bidding truthfully is an equilibrium, by relying on the revelation principle.
Within the class of sucli mechanisms they then determine those mechanisms for which the
sum of a priori-expected profits by all ring members is maximal. Unlike in our study coali-
tion proofness is neglected by taking enforcement o( the cartel agre,ement as granted, e.g. by
an enforcing institution or by I'olk Theorem-type of arguments (see McAfee and McMillan,
1992, p. 581). The autlrors distinguish weak and strong rings where transfer payments aze
(im)possible in (weak) strong rings. Most of their analysis assumes that all bidders are ring
members. Lrcomplete rings are only discussed for the example wben true values can assume
only two levels.
In our view, one does not derive actually implementable mechanisms when using the reve-
lation principle. Usually the optimal meclranisms depend crucially on the given beliefs wliich,
however, in reality will change rather often and rapidly. Actually, the possibility that the mech-
anism may depend on beliefs and the weaker notion of incentive compatibility (truthtelling is
in equilibrium but not necessarily the only undominated strategy) enable McAfee and McMil-
lan (1992) to avoid our impossibiGty result. It is rather questionable wliether a seller wants
to make his sales procedure depend on beliefs and whether bidders are willing to accept such
dependencies. More importantly, the mechanism is assumed to depend on beliefs which are
common knowledge what raises the problem when and how this assumption can be satisfied.
Thus it seems justified to say that McAfee and McMillan investigate more the range of possible
reaults tlran actually implementable mechanisms for ring formation in aucl.ions.
The retnainder of tliis paper is organised as follows: [n Section 2 we narrow down the set of
mechanisms to the unit square (a,p) with 0 C a,p C 1 and discuss tlre possibiGtics for incentive
compatible mechanisms. Section 3 is devoted to the special case of n- 2 bidders for which we
derive the general solution for all a,p-mechanisms and all information conditions satisfying t.he
IfD-assumption o( indepcndently and identically distributed true valucs. 2ing games are then
the subject of Section 4 whereas the concluding Section 5 summarizes our results and indicates
their limitalions.4
2 An axiomatic approach
Assume that a unique ancl indivisible commodity is to be sold by an auction witli bidders
i- 1, ..., n where n~ 2. To have something epecific in mind think of a unique piece of art or
a building in a certain location. A ring is a non-empty subaet C of N- {1,...,n}. Bidders in
the complement C- {i E N: i ~ C} of C will be ca7led non-ring members or (ring) outsiders.
We denote by c the number oi bidders in C.
Our analysis is based on the following basic assumption about the market decision process
(Graham and Marshall, 1987, rely on a similar sequential model): First all ring members i E C
choose bids b;(1 0). Only one member r E C repeats his bid in the following auction wh~~n
all outsiders j E C choose their bids 6~(1 0). To have a convenient terminology the first stage
when all ring members bid is called preauction whereas we refer to the second stage as tlre
main auctian.
Observe that every bidder k E N submita just one bid 6k. Tbus tbe decisions ofboth decision
stages are summarized by tbe vector 6-(br,...,b„) of non-negative bids. To determine Ure
auction mechanism with ring C the rules ot the game must uniquely determine for all possible
bid vectors 6 the following results:
- thc winncr w(L) in the main auction
- the price p(b) which the winner w(b) must pay to tlre seller
- the winner r(b) of the preauction, i.e. the designated representative of tlre ring C in tlte main
auction
- the transfer payments t~~61(b) of the ring's representative r(b) to all his fellow ring members
i with i E C and i~ r(b).
Thus an auction mechanism with ring formation can be described by
Ir -(NiCiw(')~P('),r('),(t~tbl(.) : i E C, i~ r(b)))
with N being the set of bidders, C the ring, and w(.), p(-), r(.), and trtbl(-) for all i E C, i~ r(b),
being functions of the bid vector 6. In the following we will narrow down the cl~ss of possible
mechauisms u by imposing some intuitively convinciug propcrties.
Axiom 1 nEnvyJreeness with respect to óidsn. Accor~ding to his óid no Lidder oj Ure main
auction prefers another (rnain auclion) óidder's net trade to his oum one; similarly no ring
member preJers another ring member's net trade to his own one accontirrg to his bid.
Axiom 1 is an obvious a.daptation of an axiom used by Guth (198fi) to limit and describe
auctions and fair division games. It essentially rules out arbitrary generosity, i.e. better terms
of trade (or specific bidders.
Tlrere is, lrowever, a sliglrt ambiguity when generalising the axiom as used in Culh (]98fi)
to the situation at hand. Consider the case r(b) - w(b), i.e. the object is sold to the ring's
respresentative. When deciding whether another ring member i~ r(b) prefers r(L)'s nct trade
or not one has to specify whether this íncludes also the price, which r(L) pays, or whether one
has to base this decision on the price which i as the ring's representative would have to pay in
case he wins the main auction. In the following Axiom 1 will be always interpreted in the sense5
that ring members i~ r(b) do not rely on the price wliich r(b) pays but on the price which
they would have to pay as the ring's representative. Tlius the main implicationa of Axiom 1
are described by ~
Theorem 1 For a mechonism p Axiom 1 implies the jollouring requirements:
(i) For all b the winner w(b) oj the main auction is the highest óidder in the main auction.
(ii) For a116 the sales price p(b) must satisjy
bW(b) ? P(b) ? b:(b)
where b,(b) is the second higheat óid in the main auction, i.e. the highest non-urinning
bid.
(iii) Denote by p'(b) jor all i E C the sales price in the main auclion ij i wns chosen as ring
C's representatiue in the main auction: For a!I bid vectors b the ring's representative
is the ring member r(b) E C whose surplus b,(b) - p'(6)(b) is maximal among all ring
members.
(iv) For all b the transjer payments t~(b)(b) are zero ij r(G) does not win the main nuclian;
otherwise r(b) makes the same transjer payrnent t'(6)(L) to al( olher ring members, i.e.
t~(b)(b) - t'(6)(b) jor all i ~ r(G),i E C, where t'(b)(G) satisfies
G l
b'tb) -~T 6(6) ~ t'(6)(G) ~ max 0~ b~(6) -~e(b)( )J
~
here b,tb) - p,(b)(b) is the second highest surplus in the preauclion.
ProoL Envyfreeness with respect to bids applied to the main auction implies
bw(b) - P(b) ? 0~ b~ - P(b)
for all bidders j with j~ w(b) in the main auction. By adding p(b) one obtains
bwtt) ? Y(b) ? bi
for a(1 bidders j~ w(b) in the main auction from which statements (i) and (ii) of Theorem 1
follow. Similarly, t~(6)(b) ~ t~~b)(b) ~ t~tb)(b) for all ring members i,i' witlr i,i' ~ r(b) implies
that all ring members mnst receive the same transfer payment from r(6). Applying Axiom 1
to the preauction yields tlrerefore the condition
b,(6) - P'(6)(b) - (c - 1)t'(6)(b) ~ t'(b)(L) ~ G~ - P~(b) - (c - 1)t'tb)(6)
or
r(b) br(b) - P (b) ~ t'(b)(b) ~ b~ - P~(b) for all i E C, i~ r(b).6
The latter condition implies statement (iii) of Theorem 1 ae well as statement (iv) for the case
of 6,(y) ~ p'(6)(b). If 6,(6) ~ p'(6)(b) does not hold, the highest outside bid
b~-max(b~:jEL~}
satisfies 6C ~ 6,(6). For 6~ ~ b,(6) a positive transfer payment t~(6)(b) would obviously violate
Axiom 1 since according to his bid r(b) would prefer the net trade t'(6)(b) to his own one. For
b,(6) ~ 6~ ~ 6,(6) it tollows from
6r(6) - P'(6)(b) - (e - 1)t'(b)(b) ~ t'(6)(b) ~ -(c - I)t'(6)(b)
or
br(") - pr(6)(b) ~ t'(")(b) 1 0
c
that t'(6)(b) must be non-negative. Thus we have proved statement (iv) for all possible cases
6,(6) ~ 6~,6,(y) ~ b~ 1 b,(y), and bC ~ b,(6). Q.E.D.
According to Theorem I the winner of the auction must be a}righest bidder. Tliis is the
usual assumption in auction theory which mostly is assumed without any justification. There
is a minor ambiguity concerning the case of more than one higlrest bid in the main auction:
According to part (i) of Theorem 1 every highest bidder can be arbitrarily selected as w(b).
By imposing anonymity one could easily avoid this since anonymity requires that every highest
bidder is chosen as w(b) with equal probability. The winner of the preauction is the ring
member wliose bid would earn the liighest surplus in the main auction.
Anothe,r implication of Theorem 1 is that the wholc transfer payment must be distributed
equally among all ring members. The lower bound for this sum is what another ring represen-
tative could have won, i.e. b,(y) -p'(6)(b) if this is non-negative. The upper boimd is the profit
b,(b) - p'(b)(b) of the ring's actual representative r(b) in the main auction.
It may cause confusion that it depends on the price p'(G) for all i E C who is chosen
as the ring's representative r(b). Obviously tl~is means that ring membcrs must rely on an
unambiguous prediction of the bids b~ by all non-ring members. According to Axiom I alone
the prices p'(6) can be arbitrarily chosen in the range 6W(b) ~ P'(b) ~ 6,(b). So we cannot
rule out by Axiom 1 alone that for two ring members i and j one has p'(b) ~ 1~(b) although
6; C b~. Such arbitraty dependencies will, however, be eliminated by our further requirements
for mechanisms p.
Anotlrer possibility is, ofcourse, to rely on the stricter generalisation of Cuth (193G)'s axiom
according to which envyfreeness within the ring is based purely on the price which the ring's
representative r(b) pays in case of r(b) - w(b). Let us refer to this as Axiom 1'. Clearly, tliis
will not a(tect statements (i) and (ii) of Tlreorem 1. Thus the stronger implications of Axiom
1' can be described by substituting (iii) and (iv) in Theorem I by
Theorem 1' F'or a mechnnism li Axiom I' implies, in addition to (i) anrl (iiJ oJ Tàearem l,
also lhe jollowing requirr,ments:
(iii J For all bid vectors 6 the ring's representative r(b) is the highest bidder within C, i.e.
b,(y) 1 6; jor all i E C.7
(iv) For all b the transjerpayments 1;t61(b) nre zero jor r(b) ~ w(b), othenvise r(b) pays the
same amounl t'tbl(b) to all other ring memóers where t`~61(b) satisfies
b.lei c P(b) ~ t'lbl(6) ~ max ( 0, b'161 c~b) y
Proof: When Axiom 1' is used instead of Axiom 1, the condition that r(b) does not prefer
another ring member's net trade and vice versa becomes
b.lal - P(6) -(c - 1)t'~bl(b) ~ t'~61(b) 1 6; - P(b) -(c - 1)t'~61(b)
for all b with r(b) - w(G) and i E C. Clearly, tliis implies b,lyl ~ 6; for al1 i E C and the proof
of statement (iv') is similar to the proof of statement (iv) for Theorem 1. (Z.G.D.
According to (iii') the ring members obviously do not have to rely on expected and unob-
served prices when deciding who should become the ring's representative and how much he
rnust transler to others. On the other hand Axiom 1' assumes that every ring member i ~ ro(G)
bases his envy decision on the same price altbougL he as a ring representative would have to
pay a different price in the main auction. The latter reason is why in the following we rely on
Axiom 1 instead of Axiom 1' and therefore on Theorem 1.
In general, both the price p(b) in the main auction as well as the same transfer payment
t'~bl(6) for all ring members, can vary arbitrarily with 6 within the bounds given by part (ii),
respectively (iv), of Theorem 1. To rule out such arbitrary dependencies of the sales ptice and
the transfer payments we, in addition to Axiom 1, assume
Axiom 2 nlndependent weightsn. For all óid veclors b the sales price p(b) according to part
(iiJ oJ Thearem 1 is a coristant convex combination of 6W161 and 6,(b); simitarty the iransjer
payment t'lbl(b) i.s a constant convex cornbination ojb,~bl-p'~b1(b) and max{O,G„tyl-p'~61(L)},
i.e. oj its bounds due to part (ív) oj Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 For a given sel N oJ bidders and a ring C the class oj mechanisms la satisjying
Axiom 2 in addition to Axiom 1 is isomorphic to the unit square
{(a,p):0 ~ a,p G I}.
Proof: Axiom 2 and Tlieorem 1 togetlrer imply
p(G) -(1 - a)G,,,lal f ab~tbl with 0 C a G 1
as well as t'261(b) - 0 for r(b) ~ w(b) whereas for r(G) - w(b) one must have
i'161(b) - 1~ p ~6~161 - P'I61(b)) -f~ Pmax 10' 6'Ibl - p~lbl(b)J witL O C p C l.
Q.D.D.
Corrolary 1 For a~ 0 the ring's representative r(b) is the highest Gidder in the preauction iJ
Axiom 2 is satisfted in addition to Axiom 1.8
Proof: Due to Theorem 2 the condition
(~-) 6,~61 - P'~61(b) ~ 6,161 - p'tbl(b)
is equivalent to ab,~b) ~ ab,~bl which proves the claim for all a with 0 C a C l. For a- 0 one
has b; -p'(b) - 0 for i E C and all bid vectors b with i - w(b) and i as the ring's representative.
Since this implies also trlbl(b) - 0 regardless who is the ring's representative, one cannot extend
Corollary 1 to the border case a - 0. Q.F.D,
Up to now we have employed axioma which narrow down the class of possible mechanisma la
without exploring how the bidder will actually behave. To investigate bidding behavior one, of
course, has to specify the true values vk(~ 0) wltich the various bidders k- 1,..., n assign to
owning tlie commodity under consideration. Furthermore, a biclder k may know his own true
value vk but have only probabilistic beliefs concerning the true values vt oC others. An axiom
which would allow us to solve all auction games defined by p and the vector v-(vl,...,v„)
of true values, regardless of the beliefs how other bidders evaluate the commodity, is
Axiom 3 nlncentive compatibililyn. I3idding truthjully, i.e. 6k - vk, is the only undominaled
slralegy, both in the main auction as well as in ihe preauction.
Theorem 3 Y'here exists rro mechanism It satisjying Axioms 1, 8 aird 3.
Proof: Due to Theorem 2 all mechanisms p satisfying Axiorns 1 and 2 can be identified
with a vector (a,p) E[0,1)~ where a defines the pricing rule and p tlie transfer payments
as specified in the proof of Theorem 2. Due to Vickrey (1tJG1) Axiom 3 implies a- l, i.e.
p(b) - 6~~61 for all bid vectors b. Thus if r(b) wins in the main auction and if all ring outsiders
bid truthfiilly, one has p(b) - v~ - max{v~ : j E C}. To show non-existence we provi~le
an example showing that it is impossible to satisfy incentive compatibility for all biddcrs:
Assume n- 3, C-{1, 2}, vr ~ vz ~ v3 - 0 and that v-(vr, v2, v3) is common knowledge.
Truthful bidding of all other bidders implies the following payoff for bidder 1 who is the ring's
representative:
ur-(1-p)Zt-p2 if ót~uz
since due to ~- 1 the price p(v) is given by v~ - va - 0. Obviously, this payoff does not
depend on 61 if and only if p- I. IIut for a - I - p, and truthful bids of all other bidders
k(~ 2) ring member 2's payoíF is bz~2 for all bz with 0 C bz c vt which shows tha.t one cannot
satisfy incentive compatibility for all bidders. (~.F.p.
It is no surprise that Axioms l, 2 and 3 together cannot be satisfied since the strategic situa.t.ion
within the ring resembles a game of fair division as studied by Giith and Van Damme (198G)
for which a similar impossibility statement Lolds. To avoid this inconsistrncy of Axioms 1, 2
and 3 Graham and Marshall (1987) have to introduce an artificia] cleariug institution called
ring center. Since all payments within the ring C are transformed into payments to or (rom the
ring center, which is not considered as a player, our Impossibility Theorem 3 can be avoided.
In our view, impossibility statements show that one requires too much. For the case at hand
tliis means that hoping to satisfy Axioms 1, 2 and 3 altogether is too naive an expectation.
)Jspecially, it seems naive to hope that one can satisfy incentive compatiliility even wlien tlie
gains of ring formation have to be distributed among ring membets. We want to indicate tliat9
one can ariomatically derive a unique mechanism P-(a, p) E[0,1]~, if one subetitutes Axiom
3 in Theorem 3 by a weaker requirement.
Axiom 4 "Urider~Giddingproojness". Forring members the condition oJiricentive compatibility
is substituted by requiring only one half of it, namely underbidding proojness, i.e. óidding
6; G v; is Jor all ring members i E C a dominated strntegy. For ring outsiders tlre requirement
oj incentive compatibility is maintained.
Theorem 4 The only mechanism p satisjying Axioms 1, 2 and .{ is defined by a- 1 - p.
Proof: We have to show that a- p- 1 is the only mechanism satis(ying Axiom 4. Clearly,
for all ring members i~ r(b) the transfer payment t~(6)(b) can only be increased by overbidding
v; and not by underbidding. Assume now that r(6) wins the main auction. Since his payoífis
v.(b) - (1 - a)G.(e) - aLp - (c - 1)(1 - P)~(ó~(6) - 6~) - (c - 1)p~max{0, b,(6) - b~},
underbidding proofnesa reqrrires that the coefficient
- ~1 - a -F ~(c- 1)(1 - P)~
oC b,(b) is non-negative, i.e. r(b) cannot increase lris payo(f by bidding a lower value. This,
however, is equivalent to
~[1-c-1(1-P), 11
c
which can be only satisfied by a- 1 - p. Clearly, the mechanism p defined by a- 1 - p is
incentive compatible for ring outsiders and underbidcling proof for ring members as required
by Axiom A. Q.E.D.
Although Theorem 4 suggests a unique axiomatic resolution for our problem to design the
mechanism 1~, we do not confine our analysis to this result. The reason is that restrictions of
strategic manipulation in the sense of overbidding or underbidding the true va.lue compete with
other properties. Especia.lly our initial assumption that ring C is formed can only be sustained
if there exists no possibility to improve upon the result irnplied by C by forming a subring of C.
In the next section we will investigate firat for tlte special case of n- 2 bidders whether or not
underbidding proofness, i.e. Axiom 4, competes with tlte requirement of coalition proofness,
i.e. stability with respect to the formation of subrings.
In the next section we will investígate all mechanisms !c -(a,p) E[0,1]2 when for i-
1, ..., n the true value v; o( bidder i is i's private information. Before we brie0y want toconsider
the extreme situation when all true values vi,...,v„ are common knowledge. Without loss of
generality we can assume that v~ is the Lighest true value in the ring C and v~ the second
highest true value in C whereas v~ denotes thc highest true value outside C. We neglect in
tlre following the uninteresting cases vl - v~ and vt - vZ. The case oC an overall ring C- N
can be caphtred by v~ - 0.
In case of v~ 1 vr any eyuilibrium requires w(b) ~ C. Thus we can assume ur 1 vC. If




? 1 ~p(b:-(I-a)b:-avc)f ~(b:-(1-a)b:-avc)
is equivalent to v; ~ b;. In case of vr ~ vC 1 vs equilibrium bids 61 - b~ G vp are impossible
so that one has
v~ ~ br - bz 1 max{vziv~} whenever w(b) E C,
i.e. whenever vL. G vr. This shows that in the extreme situation where all true values are
common knowledge, it cannot be decided by equilibrium analysis alone t,ow profits are dis-
tributed within the ring C. Whenever vr ~ max{v2,v~} many distributions of profits can
be supported by corresponding equilibria. Fortunately, we will not envisa.ge sucli troublesome
ambiguity when allowing for private information about true values in the sequel.
3 Bidding behavior in case of ring formation (n - 2)
When solving auction games explicitly, we will rely on the IID-assumption of~ndependent and
jdentically ~istributed true values. Accotding to this assumption the true value v; of bidder
i- 1,...,n is only known to bidder i whereas all other bidders expect v; to be determined
by an independent chance move whose distribution F(.) is tlie same for bidders i- 1,...,n.
Due to the a priori symmetry of all bidders one can hope to find a symmetric soliition, i.e. an
equilibrium point prescribing the same bidding behavior 6;(v;) - t(v;) for all bidders i. The
symmetric bidding strategy must epecify a unique bid t(v;) by bidder i for all values v; w},icl,
I,is opponents j(~ i) consider as possible (see Harsanyi, 1967~68).
If the seller has chosen a positive reservation value, all bids G; and Lrue values v; are un-
derstood as the amounts by which they exceed thia predetermined reservation valuo. Thus we
can assume b; ~ 0 and v; ) 0 for all biddera i-],...,n. I[ for all biddcrs i- 1,...,n thc
highest expected value v; is finite, we, furthermore, can renormalise the monetary unit in such
a way that 0 C v; ~ 1 for all expected valuea v; of all bidders i- 1, ..., n. For the IID-ca.se
tl,is means that F(0) - 0 and F(1) - I for i- 1,...,n. For mathematical convenience it will
be assumed that F(.) has a ditferentiable derivative j(.) which is positive on [0,1]. A special
case of sucli a distribution is the uniform distribution on [0,1] witli F(v;) - v; E[0, 1].
A bidding strategy t(v;) is called monolonic if t(v;) ~ E('v;) whenever v; ~ v;. When trying
to solve auctions with rings satisfying the 1[D-assumption, we will searcl, !or a symmetric
equilibrium t(v;) in monotonic and differentiable bidding stratrgies. Due to this azsumpt.ion
the inverse bidding function exists, i.e. expressions like v; - t-~(G;) are well-defined.
a) The special case of n- 2
Due to n- 2 the only iuteresting ring is C - N- {1,2}. If bidder i- 1,2 wiU, true value
v; expects the other bidder j(~ i) to use the equilibrium strategy L~(v~) - t(v~), his payoff
expectation L,,;(G;) depends on his own bid b; as follows:lI
o[
I'rom
E~~(6;) - ~ ~i(vi) [v~ - (1 - a)b; - 2~1(vi) - (1 Zp)~b;~ J(vi)dvi




E~~(b;) -[v: -(I - a f I 2 pa)b;) F(t-'(b;))
f 2~6;(1 - F(t-~(b;))) - 2~ f~-~lb.) t(vi)I(vi)dvi 1-p ' J
f-a f t(vi)j(vi)dvi
2 r~(6~)
db;E":(b;) -(vr - 6;)j(t-'(b;))dt dbb;) ~~-
F(t-'(~;))(1 - 2) - ~
one obtains the inhomogeneous (ordinary) differential equation




( P~ - (2 - a)F(v;) 9(v;) - P~ - (2 - ~)F(v;) ~
Its homogeneous version
has a leít solution
t~(v;) - ct ~2p~~ - F(v;)~-a-A for all 0 C v; C v;,ci E)ft,
and a right solution
t,.(v;) - c, ~F(v;) - zP~~~-~ for v; G v; G l,c, E R,
where v~ is the critical value v; for which
P~
i'(v;) ~ h(v;)i(v;) - 0
2-~-F(v;)
holds. Due to v; E[0, 1] this solution, which is not a solution o[ our problem, is neither
monotonic nor differentiable.12
To determine a particular solution, which solvea our problem, we try to derive a solution of
the form
t(v;) - c(v;)l(v;)
where the constant c of the óomogeneoua solution t(.) is substituted by a ditierentiable function
c(-) o[ v;. Since
and
one obtains
t'(v:) - c(v:)try(v:) t ~(v:)t(v:),
t'(v:) f h(v:)c(v:)t(v:) - 9(v:),
c(v;)t'(v;) f c'(v;)L(v;) -1- lt(v;)c(v;)t(v;) - g(v;).
Substitution of i'(v;) --h(v;)~(v;) therefore yielda
~(v:) - i(v:)
Integrating c'(v;) both for t(v;) - 1;(v;) and {(v;) - tr(v;) yields a left solution 2;(v;) a.nd
a right solution tr(v;) including ccefficients ct and cr, respectively. To make the solution t(v;)
differentiable at v~ one obviously must have
tl(vi )
- Vi - tr(vi )
where we recall that
This boundary condition leads to
t'(v:) - 2f(v:)(Kv:) - v:)
Pa- (2 - a)F(v:)




v;- fv1 ~F~~~-~~ dx for v~ C v; G i.
` 9-A
Due to the definition o[ v; the integrand on the right hand side of thc eqnation above is ahvays
non-negative and not greatcr than 1 so that t(v;) is well-defined for all v; E(~, 1] and prescrib~s
underbidding the true valuein Lhe range v; ~ u~ and overbidding in the range v; G v;. Since
f(.) is positive and continuous, it also follows that t'(v;) is positive for all n; E[p, 1].
For the special case of a uniform distribution on [0,1], the bidding function i(v;) is of the
simple form
t(v~) - 4p~~ f ,j ? ~v;













Figure 1: The special case of uniform belie(s on [0, 1].
The parameter p does not matter at all for the bidding behavior in case of a- 0, i.e. when
the price p(b) in the tnain auction is solely determined Uy the highest bid b,,,~yl. The intuition
for this invariance result is, of course, that in case of p(b) - ówtyl the designated ring's repre-
sentative r(L) with G,161 ~ G,~yl does not pay a lower price if all other ring members ahstain
from bidding in tlie main auction. For p- 0 an inctease of a from a- 0 to a- 1 impli~ a
counterclockwise rotation of i(v;) as indicatecí hy the arrow in Figure 1. tiVhen a is positive,
an increase of p causes a parallel upward shift of t(v;) as grapl~ically illustrated by the extreme
sl~ift from (a - 1, p- 0) lo (a - 1, p- 1).
1'he payoffexpectation Ev; for bidder i's type v;, implied by the lincar solution t(v;) for the
special case of uniform beliefs is
?
F.,,; -~2 -~ ~(2~~ 1~~ p) for all v; E[D,1],i- 1, 2.
'1'hus in caae of a~ 0 eveu for v; - 0 the payo(f expectation Ev; is posítivo. For a- 0 one
obtaius Ev; - v?~2. lf a- 0, the payoff expectation E,,; does not depend on the transfer rule
p. The othcr extreme pricing rule a- 1 implics
vZ 1
~v: - ~ f ~ .
TLe formula of thc equilibrium payo(i expectation Ev; tor the general distrihution 1'(v;) with
carrier [O,l] is derived in Appendix A. We do not try to discusa this mucó more complicated
formula.14
I ---- -- ----~~
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P'igure 2: '1'hc gmwral Jistribntimr on [0, 1].
I tr'
v;
lu Cigurc 2 we havc lricd lo illuslrale a lypical LiJding curvc krr lhc citualion crf a vnn-
tnlifonn dislribulion F'(.) on [U,l]. Sincc v; - F-t (~'~), lhc LiJdivg funr.lion t(u;) assnuu~s
Ulal a is posilivc. Tor ~- 0 Ule bidding flwction t(v;) would :Jtvays salisfy v; ~ t(v;) u fnr
lhc casc u( lha liueu JiFlrihulion. I'or a~ 0 onc ovcrbide in lLr, rangc 0 C u; G vj auJ unr,
underLiJs in llle range u; G v; G 1. 'fhe rcaeon for overlridding iF oLvioualy ll~ inJaco a Ili~;ócr
trangfer paymcnl from llle rinp,'s rcprcr,culalive. UuJorbidJing for high valuos has twlt cffocts,
uamcly a lvwcr transfcr payment if oue ia chosen sLS lllc riug's represevlativc a.nd a Illwrr pricc
in lhc maiu ancliou. Ouly in lllc cxtrmrrc c.uc a- 1 lllr. lallcr roa.aon dncs u~lt ,ilply dllr lr,
p(L) - G~(b). l~or lhe speci:41 c:cae a- 1 lhe LidJiug funclimt t(v;) simplifieA tlr
F-r P 7~ r ~ n; I- ,~d. O(~~) dz for U C tr; G u~
t(t'~) - 1 1 ~
t'~- fj-jr(n) ~1'l i)il rlx for v; C r; G I.
, ~






; - r(i,,)(1- ~)
,t ~a a ;r; - ,~;
~~-,,;(~,) - (l - -)r(i,;) .
,ir,; - z z T, - t(i.;)'15
This means that we rely on the bidding function b;(v;) - t(v;) which assigns a bid t(v;) to all
values v; E[0,1]. This has to be distinguished from the necessary condition
0- db;Ev~(6;) ~e;-e(,,;)~ tr(v;) - ~t(v~F
vv~)i(v;~
z ( )( s )
for a local payoff maximum.
We want to check whetlrer local deviations from t(v;) imply a payoff decrease. For t(v;) ~ v;
a local deviation from t(v;) to i(v;) implies also t(v;) ~ v"; which is true only for v; ~ v;. IIence
2 -(1-2)F(v;)
-v; - t(v;) (~)
is negative. Thus ~y-E,,;(b;) is positive for v; c v; and negative for v; ~ v; which proves that
the equilibrium bidding bchavior 6;(v;) - t(v;) for biddcrs i- 1, 2 and all values v; E[0, 1] witlr
v; C v; is a local maximum. Obviously a similar argument proves that b;(v;) - t(v;) describea
also a local maximum in tlie range v; ~ vj. The same analysis applies also to v; - v~ .
Our results are summarised by
Theorem b There is a unique symmetric equilibrium in monotonic and rli,(jerentiable óidding
strntegiea, name(y
v; f fvf ~~ ~~ dx jor 0 C v; C v;
F : -~ ~
v; - j~~ ~(~~~ dx jor v~ G v; C 1. `F(v,)-~
It has to be expected that one can obtain the uniqueness result for tbe solution strategy
t(-) by imposing much weaker conditions. For normal auctions Plum (1992) has slrown, fot
instance, that the requirements of monotonicity and di)Terentiability by Giith and Van Damme
(1986), can be derived if one just requires measurability of solution strategics.
b) Coalition-proofness and profitability of ring formation for n- 2
We first define coalition-prooi mechanisms in general before restricting them to tlre special case
oC n - 2. Let
G - (St,...,Sn, Ut,..., U„)
be an n-person normal form game. For every strategy vector 6-(sr,...,.9„) E.Sr x... x S„
and coalition C C N- {1,...,n} we define the normal form game
GC(9) - 1(Sj)IEC,(l~~ )jEC)
by
Uj (9C) - Uj(aC,,N`C)
fof all 9C -(3j)jEC E X jECSj wl7Cre 8N`C -(Sk)kEN,k~e- We call G~(s) the C-reduced game
tor 3.ls
With the help of this notation we can defiae coalition-proofness recursively: If n- 1, every
equilibrium is coalition-proof. For n 1 1 assume that coalition-proofness is defined for all
n' ~ n: An equilibrium a' -(ai,...,a;,) of the n-person game is coalition-proof if
(i) for all coalitions C C N,C ~ N the strategy vector (a')c is coalition proof in G~(s')
and
(ii) there does not exiat another equilibrium à-(àt,...,à„) satisfying (i) as well as U~(s) ~
U~(s') for all j E N.
Thus coalition proofness essentially relies on a consistent use oC payotídominance in tl~e sense
that all players under consideration are better olC. For n- 2 coalition proofness implies tl~at
there exists no other equilibrium which payoRdominates the equilibrium s' under consideration
in the sense o( the second requirement in (ii). Since for n- 2 every proper subcoalition C of
N-{1, 2} contains only a single player, the very notion of a strategic eqnilibrium implies the
coalition proofness of ac in Gc(a').
Since we only accept symmetric equilibria in monotonic and differentiable bidding strate-
gies, the uniqueness result of Theorem 5 implies that tliere can be no other such equilibria
payoff dominating tlie solution t(.) described in Theorem 5. Thus an immediate implication of
Theorem 5 is
Corrolary 2 If one only conaiderasymmetric equilibria in monotonic and rli,(jerenliablestrate-
gies, the solution described in Theorem 5 ia coalilion-proof.
If only two bidders are present, i.e. if n- 2, an alternative to forming the ring C- N-
{1,2} is to bid competitively. We shall prove that ring formation is morc profitahlc for every
bidder i and true value v; than competitive bidding. Guth and Van Uannne (198fi), who stndy
competitive bidding by assuming the same solution requirements as we do, Lave derived the
bidding function
r i.
~(v;) - v; - JV~ ~F~v~~ ~-A dx for all v; E[O,1J and i- 1,2.
Observe first of all that
t(v;) - t(v;) for all v; E[0,1)
in case of a- 0 since this implies v; - 0. Notice, furthermore, that a- 0 implies that
there will be no transfer payment from the ring's representative to the other ring member since
abstention from bidding in the main auction has no elTect on the price which r(b) must pay
in the main auction. Thus for J1 - 0 the preaaction in case of ring format.ion is strategira.lly
equivalent to the main auction in case o[competitive bidding. Thos the pmblem ofprofitability
only arises if the parameter a is positive.
Assume now that a is positive. For the special case of the nniform density on [0, 1] the
payoff expectation
Ev~ - 2 f
~lP(~ 1~jP)
of bidder i's type v; E[O,1J in case of ring formation dependa crucially on the parameter a~ 0
whereas the corresponding payoff expectation
E,,; - v?J217
for tl~e case of competitive bidding (see equation (III.22) of Guth and Van Damme, 198G) dcea not depend on a due to the so-called equivalence propertiea of symmetric competitive auctiona.
Clearly, a ~ 0 implies
E,,; ~ É~; for all v; E[U,1],
wliat proves tlie profitability of all mechanisms p-(a,p) E[U,1]2 for the special case of the uniform density. In Appendix B it is shown that this result can be generalised to general distributions F(.) on (U,1] satisfying our assumptions:
Theorem 8 Al! mechanisms ~-(a, p) E[U,1)~ are projilable what jor n- 2 simply means
that no óidder lype v; E[U, 1] cnn gain by inducing competitive bidding. For 1 ~ 0 all bidder typea v; E[U, 1] goin by ring jormation; jor a- 0 ring jormation has no e,(ject al all, neilher
on bida nor on payoff expectations oj bidder types as well as oJ the seller.
4 A subclass of ring games (n 1 2)
If there are more than two bidders, i.e. for n~ 2, and if a ring C C N- {1,...,n} with at least two members is formed, we will refer to such an auction simply as a ring game. To simplify our analysis we will rely on a given bidcling bchavior of all non-ring membera. Actually
it will be a.ssumed that the highest bid
x-max{b~:jEN,jIÉC}
of all non-ring members is determined by a distribution G on [U,1] which is common knowleclge
to all ring members whose density is denoted by g. Thus the only strategic agents of a ring game are the members of the ring itse]L As for the special case of n- 2 it will be assumed
that the true value v; E[U,1] ot each ring member i E C is private iuformation and that all
other ring members expect v; to be determined by a chance move according to a distribution
F(.) on [U, 1] which is the same for all bidders i E C and wl~ich has a continuous and positive
density j(.) on [U, 1]. In other words: The beliefs within the ring C satisfy Llie IID-assumption.
One way to justify the given behavior of ring outsiders is to assume that outsiders are
unawaze of the ring. To be more specific assume, for instance, that the IID-assumptions holds
with respect to all bidders and not only for ring members. Since ring outsiders are unaware o( the ring, they therefore would bid competitively as analysed by Giith and Van Damme (1986),
i.e. the behavior of all ring outsiders would follow the biclding strategy
~~ ((r) T~
t(vi)-vi-~
(I v))n dr (orall v~E[U,1],7~C.
~
Let y denote the maxima.l trne value among ring outsiders, i.e.
y- max{vl E[U, 1] : j E N, j~ C}.
Clearly, due to the IID-assumption for all bidders in N the distribution of y is
Gc(v) - F(y)"-`18
where c is the number of bidders in ring C. This implies that the highest bid
r (Fr l~
x - t(y) - y - I lF~I
dr
by ring outsiders is governed by the distribution
Gc(x) - ~`c(t-'(x)),
which shows that one can justify our asaumptíons for ring games in a consistent way.
As before we will search for a symmetric and atrictly monotonic equilibrium t:[0,1] y[0,1]
tor the ring membera, i.e. t(v;) - b;(v;) for all v; E[0,1] and all ring members i E C where
t(v;) ~ 1(v;) whenever v; ~' v;. If type v; of bidder i E C bids 6; and assnmes that all oUier
ring members j E C rely on t(.), his.payoftexpectation is denoted by E,,;(G;). To define E,,;(b;)
formally we introduce the following useful notation:
y-maz{v~:jEC and j~i}
z- max{v~ : j E C`{i}, j~ k for some k with vk - y}
Clearly, for given true values the payoff of bidder é depends on the ordering of x, tlie higl,est
bid by ring outsiders, as well as y and z, the highest, respectively second highest competing
bid in the preauction. Let ,p(y,z) denote the joint density of y and z. To calculate E,,;(b;) we
distinguish the following 9 cases:
(1) b; ~ t(y) ~ t(z) ~ x
(2) 6; ~ t(y) ~ x ~ t(z)
(3) b; ~ x~ t(y) ~ i(z)
(4) t(y) ~ b; ~ t(z) ~ x
(5) t(y) ~ 6; ~ x ~ t(z)
(G) t(y) ~ x ~ b; ~ t(z)
(7) t(y) ~ i(z) ~ b; ~ x
(8) t(y) ~ t(z) ~ x ~ 6;
(9) t(y) ~ x ~ t(z) ~ b;
Whenever x is larger than b; and t(y), a ring ontsider malces the deal so tI1At bicl(ler i'R prnfit
is zero. Relying on thia case distinction E,,;(b;) can be described as the sum
E,,(br) - ~i t... f Iy
where19
Ir - Iy-(6')I:ot:~u[vi-(1-a)bi-ax-a ~r(Pt(Y)f(1-P)bi)i-~ ~' x19(x)dx,P(Y,z)dzdY,
Is- .Íy-06')I:(YÓf:-o(s)[vi-(1-a)b;-ax-aacr (Pt(Y)f(1-P)bt)-Fa ~' z]~(Y,z)dz9(x)dzdY,
I3 - f:-o Íy-ór)Íio[vr - (1 - a)bi - ax - a ~r(1 - P)(bi - x)]cP(Y, z)dxdY9(x)dz,
f~ - Ívr' (a:) fr-ó
6:)
f:~ó ~[Pbt f (1- P)t(Y) - x)9(z)dx,P(Y, z)dzdY,
Is - fr-r-' (s:) f:-o fr-(i) ~[Pbi -F (1 - P)t(Y) - z]~P(Y,z)dz9(x)dxdY.
Ie - f~e-~(6;) J:~ 5: fr-ó6:) ~(1 - P)(t(Y) - x)'P(Y, z)dz9(x)dzdY,
Ir - fv r~(a:) fvr-~ (e:) f~-o ~[Pt(z) f(1 - P)t(Y) - x)9(z)dz~P(Y, z)dzdY,
fe - Íy-r-' (6J fc-r~ (e:) fs(6: c[Pt(z) f (1 - P)t(Y) - x)9(x)dz~(Y, z)dzdY,
Ia - v-r~ e; f~~ é; c-~(i) ~ 1- t x z dz z dxd f ( ) f-r (6:) ~( P)( (Y) - )~P(Y, ) 9( ) Y-
Unlike in the special case n- 2 where we allowed for general distributions F(.) on [0, 1] with positive and differentiable densities j(.) on [0,1] we will mainly rely on tlie linear distribution F(v;) - v; E[0,1] wlien studying ring games. As shown for n - 2 the results Cor the uniform density can be generalised in a straightforward way but at the costs ofhigl~ly complex formulae which do not lend themselves to easy interpretations and il]ustrations. It will become clear in the followiag that already the special case of the uniform density requires quite complicated
conaiderations.
For the uniform distribution cartel outsiders j~ C bid according to
2(v~) - n-~ v~ for all v~ E[0,1] and j~ C.
Due to
we therefore Lave
t-' (x) - n - ~x
n-1
n - a "-`
Gc(x) -
x~ n-1
for all x E [0, ~J and all rings C C N. In the following we will mainly investigate ring
games where all ring members i E C expect another ring member j's true value v~ to be cliosen
according to F(v~) - v~ E(0, 1] and where for a11 rings C C N all ring iriembers expect the lrighest bid z by a ring outsider to be chosen a.ccording to Gc(x) as defined above.
5 The solution of ring games
In addition to monotouicity which has already been imposed to guarantee that the symmetric
equilibrium bidding function t(.) is invertible we require as always that t(-) is di(ferentiable. L~ subsection a) we first derive the differential equation to t(.). Subsection b) concentrates on the
uniform distribution and C- N.20
a) The necessary condition for a best response (n 1 4 and 3 C c G n)
Let N- {1,...,n} with n 1 4 be the aet o[ biddera and, without losa of generality, let
C-{1,...,c} with 3 C e G n be the ring. The two border casea c - 2 and c- n will be
analysed aeparately. The density j(-) of F(-) and g(-) of C(.) aze assumed to be continuous on
[0,1]. The joint denaity ~p(y, z) introduced in Section 4 is given by
W(Y,z) - (c - 1)(c - 2)Í(Y)F(z)`-3I(z)
where c is the number of ring membere. Let Jr - Il f Iz. Since
1t-t(b:) rv rt(v) ~ a c- 1
Jr - J l vc -(1- a)ó~ - ax -( )(Pt(Y)f
y-0 s-0 r-0 C
(1 - P)bt) t ~(cc 1)z] 9(x)dz~P(Y,z)dzdy
one has d~ - Jlt f Jtz where
~ a(~ -1)(1-P)~ ft-t(6:) fv ft(~)
Jtt -- 1- a f 9(z)dx~P(Y,z)dzdy
c ~o :-o r-o
and
dt"t(6.) re-t(s:) r6: a(c - 1) a(c - 1) 1 t
Jts - ~ J ! [v; - (1 - a)b~ - ax - 6~ f zJ
9(x)dzeP(t- (b~),z)dz. dL~ s-0 s-o C C
I'urthermore, ~? - J31 t Jas where
a(c- 1)(1 -P) bc e-t(s) rv
J3t --~1- a f )1- I J sv(Y, z )dzdY9( x)dx
c r-o y,-o :-o
aud ft-t(b:)Jy




( 6; t-~(6:) v
Jtt -F Jat -- I I- a f ~(C - 1)(1 - P)1 r- .9(x)dx I f ~(Y, z)dzdy
l c J Jr-o v-o -n
-- I1 - a f~(c - 1)(1 - P)1 G(b~) rt-~(b:)(c
- 1)(F(y))`-~I(Y)dy
l c J Jv-o
- - rl - ~ } a(c - lc(1 - P)1
C(6~)(F(t-t(b~)))`-t,
Jtz - dtdbb~)I(t-1(b~))(c- 1)(F(t-1(br)))`-z I(vr -(1 - c~ 6~I C(b~) - c Jrb'ox9(x)d2J ,21
and
J3~ - (v~ - b;)9(b~)(F(t-~(b~)))`-r.
The sum I~ f...~ 18 can be expressed as J~ -F. Jb t JB with
~ v ~(r) J.-1-- 1 f (1 - P)~(t(Y) - x)9(x)dx~Y, z)dzdY,
v-~ '(b:) ~-v z-e c
r1 t-~(b;) b; ~
JS - J I I p(b~ - x)9(x)dx~(Y,z)dzdY,
v-r~(b;) ~-o ~o c
and
i r Hs) a
Je - f f I p(t(z) - x)g(x)dx~(y,z)dzdy.
yet-~(bi) s-t-~(A;) sv0 c
Difterentiating these expressions yields
dJ~
a(c-1)(1-P)di-~(b;)i(t-~(b;))(F(t-'íbr)))`-~ b~G(b~)- r6~ x9(x)dx , db; - - c db; Jr-o
dJs - aP(c- 1)(1 - F(t-1(b;)))(F(t-~(b;)))`-~G(b~)f db; - c
~P(c - c)(c - 2) dt~~
6~)(F(t-~(bt)))`-3f(t-~(b;))(1 - F(t-I(b~))) L
b~G(b~) - fb'vx9(x)dxJ
-aP(é- 1)dt~b(b~)
f(t-i(br))(F(t-r(bt)))`-z Ib;G(b~)- fb~ox9(x)dxl ,
and
be -- aP(c - c)(c - 2) dt
~b(b;)(F(t-r(b~)))`-3Í(t-~ (b~))(1-F(t-~ (6~))) Ib;G;(b;) - Ib,o xg(x)dxJ .
We rewrite ~E,,;(b;) ín the form L
db; Ev; (b~)- A(br, v;)db~ t-' (br) f Il(6~, v~)
where the functions A(b;, v;) and li(b;, v;) are defined as followe:
A(b~, v;) - (c - 1)(F(t-~(6.)))`-zJ(t-~(6~))G(b;)(v~ - 6r)
11(b„ v~) -- (1 - ~) G(b~)(F(t-r(b;)))`-r f(vr - b;)9(b~)(F(t-~(b;)))`-~
}aP(c 1)(F(t-r(b~)))`-zG(b~).22
or
dt(v;) - (c - 1)j(v;)G(t(v;))(t(v;) - v;)
dv; - a ~-t G(t(v~)) - F(v;) ~(t(v;) - vc)9(t(v;)) t~1 - a) G(t(v;)),
.
~
For C - N one, of course, would have G(x) - 1 for all x with 0 C x G 1 so that the
differential equation simplifies to
dt(v;) - n(n - 1)j(v;)(t(v;) - v;)
dv; - ap(n - 1) - F(v;)(n - a)
which in case of n- 2 coincides with the differential equation derived in Section 3.a).
In case of uni(orm distributions one has F(v;) - v; for all v; with 0 C v; C 1 and
n-c
G(t) - ~t~) for 0 G t G~
1 for t ~ ~.
TLus the differential equation has the special form
dl(v;) - c(c - 1)t(v;)(t(v;) - v;)
dv; - ap(c - 1)t(v;) - v;~c(t(v;) - v;)(n - e) - (c - a)t(v;)]
for 0 G t C r-á and
dt(v;) - c(c - 1)(t(v;) - v;)
dv; - ap(c - 1) - v;(c - ~)
forl~t~~.
b) The solution for special cases
In the following we will derive and discuss the solution o( apecial cases like for special rings C
or for special distributions F(-) and G(.). We often will rely on techniques which already have
been used when analysing the special case n- 2. In such cases we sometimes only mention
the main idea of the proof instead of proving everything in fiill detail.
b.l) The grand ring C- N
Proceeding as for n- 2 the case C- N for n~ 2 can be solvecl by 6rst deriving the solution
of the homogenous differential equation
dl'(y;) - n(n - 1)j(v;)l(v;)
dv; - ap(n - 1) - (n - a)F(v;)
and then applying the variation of the constant-technique. This yields23
Theorem T Ij F(v;) - v; jor al1 0 G v; t 1, i.e. in case oj the unijorm distribution, the
solution is oJ the sirnple jorm
n~-n n-1
t(v;)-n~-~v;fn~-~pa jorall OCv;Cl.
Prooí As in the proof of Theorem 5 one can ehow that the homogenous differential equation
d{(v;) - n(n- 1)t(v;)
dv; - (n - 1)J1p - (n - a)v;
has no monotonic solution. Thue the solution, described by Theorem T, is the only one solving
dt(v;) - n(n - 1)(t(v;) - v;)
dv; - (n - 1)J1p - (n - a)v;
and satisfying the boundary condition t(v,)- v;. To prove that the ditíerential equation above
deacribea a payoff maximum one can ahow tlrat for every v; E[0,1] there exiats ó ] 0 auch that
d ~0 for v;-óGv;Cv;
db;Ev'(t(v')) - G 0 for v; C" v; C v; } ó '
For the uniform diatribution, where
(1 l"-~ d n-a(v; -" v;)(" v;-v;)
`v:I db; Ev;(t(v:)) - n " v; - t(v;) '
it [ollows from v; G v; C v; that ~Ev;(t(v;)) ie positive due to t(" v;) ~" v; in the range v; C v;.
Other casea can be checked similarly. Q.E.D.
To check the profitability of the ring C- N for the uniform distribution one has to compute
the profit expectation Ev,(a,p) implied by the solution i(v;) of the ring game and to compare
it with the payoff expectation Ëv;(~,p) in case of competitive bidding. As ahown in detail in
Appendix C one obtains for C- N and the uniform distribution the following reault:
v; (n - 1)a~p a(n - 1)
Ev:(~,P) - n t n(ns -~) f n(ns -~)(n - 1 - P)
As ahown by GutL and Van Damme ( 1986) the corresponding reault for competitive bidding is
Ev:(~,P) - v~ ~n.
Theorem 8 For C- N and the unijorm distribution F(v;) - v; jor alJ v; E[0, 1] ring
jormation is proj' itable in the sense oj
Ev:(~,P) ~ Ev.(a,P) jor a~ 0
Ev;(a,P) - Ev:(a,n) lor a- 0.
The coalition-prooó~ess of the overall ring C- N and the uniform diatribution F(v;) - v; for
all 0 C v; C 1 and i- 1, ..., n is extremely complicated. lfowever, we proved
Theorem 9 If one only consíders symmetric equilibria in monotonic and di,(Jerentiablestrate-
gies, the solulion described in Theorem T is coalition-prooJ.
A future paper will include a proof of Theorem 9.24
6 Conclusions
Although our resulte íor general ring games are etill limited, eome important policy conclusions
are already poasible: Whereae the only mechaniem p eatiefying axioms 1, 2 and 4 is defined
by a- 1- p, the oppoaite pticing rule a- 0 aeeme to provide the worst proapects for ring
membera. Since a- 0 impliee b' - p'(b) for every cartel member, this pricing rule doea not
allow for poaitive compensation paymenta t;(61(b). Furthermore, in caBe of a - 0 ring formation
has no effect whatacever on profit expectatione in case of overall rings C- N whereas a~ 0
impliea positive payofl'incentivea to [orm an overall ring.
Thua the long l~iatorical tradition ofthe J1 - 0-pricing rule, which in public tenders organised
by German public authorities can be traced bacl[ to the lóth century (see Gandenberger, 1961),
seems to be well founded on experiencea that thie pricing rule ie more immune against ring
formation. This aupports the intuition provided by Fehl and Guth (1987).
Our reaults are, however, etill incomplete since we have not yet fully explored genetal ring
games with C~ N and n~ 3. Especially we have not been able to solve generally the
di(ferential equation, derived in Section 5.a). In our future reaearch we will try to overcome
these limitations.25
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Appendix A: The equilibrium payoff expectation for the
general distribution F(v;)
Substituting t(v;) for v; and v; - t't(b;) in the payoíffunction E,,;(b;) yields
Ev, -~v; -(i - af 12 Pa)t(v;)~ F(v;) t 2a(i - F(v;))t(v;)
-2~ ~V~ t(v)dF(Y) f (1 ZP)~ It t(Y)dF(Y)
- v;F(v~) f[2~ -(1 - 2)F(v:)] t(v~)
f~(12 n) Í` t(Y)I(Y)dY - 2~ f V~ t(Y)I(Y)dY
This formula together with
t(v;) - v; -f VV I~- F(x) J ~ dx I~, lzz-F(v~)
1 ~ u v .ea -Fx l ~ ~ v r FT ~~
v t(Y)I(Y)dY - ~ YI(Y)dYf V v~~á F( )J
dx Í(Y)~tY- ~ ~ I
()-~SJ
dxf(Y)~lY 1~ ~~ ~:' ~ ' ~ - (Y) JVi ,VI lF(Y) -z-
v v v v ~-F(x) ~
I' t(Y)I(Y)dY -~~ YI(Y)dY f f, f ~
L~- F(Y)J
dx J{y)dy
for v; C v; and the corresponding formula for v; ~ v; detennines Ev; for the symmetric
equilibrium in which tl~e two bidders j- 1,2 rely on 6~(v~) - t(v~).27
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 6
We rely on the notation and results of Section 3, including Subsection 3.b: The monotonic
bidding function, derived in Guth and Van Damme (1986) is
t(v;) - v; -~V' ~ F(x) ~~ dx for all v; E[0,1], a E[0,1), i- 1, 2, o `F(v;)










E~:(br) - f wc -(1 - a)b~ - ai(x)J f(x)dx.
0
~v, t(x)f(x)dx - t(vr)F(v~) - ~v' F~~i(x~~F(~~x))dx
- i(v;)F(v~) - 1 1 a Jov, f(x)
. xdx f 1 1 ~ fv' i(x)J(x)dx
~V;
t(v~)F(v~) f 1- a Jo i(x)f(x)dx - 1 1 ~ JoV'
xf(x)dx
a rV' i(x)I(x)dx f (1 - a)t(vr)F(vt) - Iv' xj(x)dx.
E~:(a) - v;F(vr) - f V~ xf(x)dx
0
since in equilibrium one has f-~(b;) - v; and b; - i(v;) and therefore
F,,:(~) - fV~[vr - (1 - a):(v;) - ai(x))I(x)dx 0
- v;F(v;) -(1 - a)i(v;)F(v;) - a r~~ t(x)J(x)dx.
The fact that Ë,,(a) does not depend on a implies the wlell known equivalence of pricing rules
(see CutL and Van Damme, 193G, for a discussion).
We want to compare E,,;(a) with the equilibrium payofFexpectation
~ v;
E~:(a,v) - v~F(v;) -(1- a)c(v,)F(v;) - z,~ t(x)I(x)dx -(1 Zr)~t(„~)F(v~)as
f 2~t(v:)(1 - F(v:)) f(1 2P)~ Ir t(x)J(x)dx ~
- v;F(v;) - ( 1 - z)i(v;)F(v;) - z~ ~~ t(x) j(x)dx
} 2pt(,,:) f (1 2p)~ I't(x)J(x)dx
for ring formation. Observe that
-2~Pa(t(v~) - t(o)) - f~~ t(x)J(x)dx -
~P ~~' i
-2 - a Jo t(x)dx - t(v:)F(v:) t f~~ F(x)t'(x)dx -
r 0
-t(v;)I'(v:) -Jo~~ (z~P~ - F(x)~ t'(x)rlx -
2 ` jv:
-f(v:)F(v:) - 2- a Jo j(x)(t(~) - x)dx -
~; 2 ~~
-t(v:)F(v:) - 2-~ o t(x)J(x)dx f
2- a~ xJ(x)dz
due to t'(x) --h(x)t(x) -h g(x) where the functions h(.) and g(.) are defined in Section 3.a. IIence,
~;
a ~~ a
-a - a o xt(x)dx - -t(v:)F(v:) - a- af t(x)I(x)dx f 2 Pa(c(v;) - t(o))
or equivalently
- f v~ x j(x)dx --(1 - 2)t(v:)F(v:) - 2!v~ t(x)I(x)dx f 2~(t(v;) - t(0)).
Thus the inequadity É„;(a) C E,,;(a,p) is equivalent to
v;F(v;) - ( 1 - 2)t(v;)F(v;) - 2~U~ t(x)j(x)dx f 2~(t(v;) - t(0)) ~
v;F(v;) - ( f - 2)i(v;)F(v;) - 2~v~ t(x)j(x)dx ~ 2~t(v;) ~(I 2p)~ ~I t(x) j(x)dz
~
or to inequality
1- a ~ (~) Zp) j, t(x)J(x)dx t 2(1- p) f~~ t(x)J(x)dx f 2~t(o) ~ o
which is always satisfied duc to 0 G a,p,v; C 1 for i- 1,2. Clearly, Ë,,,(a) - E,,;(a,p) for a- 0 whereas by (fi) one has
E,,;(a, p) ~ É,,; (a) for all 0 ~ p, v; G 1
when a is positive. This proves Theorem 6 also for general distribution F(.) satisfying our regularity conditions. a.~.D.as
Appendix C: The equilibrium payoff expectation for C- N and
the uniform distribution
To prove Theorem 8 one has to ahow that
E~:(a v~ (n - 1)a~p a(n - 1)
( P) , P) - n f n(n~ - a) } n(n~ - a) n- 1-
for C- N and the uniform dietribution F(v;) - v; for all v; E(0,1]. Denote by a the ccefócient
of v; and by p the conatant of the aolution function t(v;), deacribed in Theorem 8, i.e.
a-n(n-1) and n-1~
n~-a Q-n~-~ P'
For this apecial case Ev;(a, p) can be deacribed as
Ev:(~,P) - Ki f Ks f K3
where
K, - V vc - (1 - a)(avt f A) -~(n - 1)(P(all f A) f(1 - P)(avt t~))] (n - 1)Y"-~dál, I-o n
t








IC~ - (n - 1)J J
~ ((1 - P)aY ~ p] (n - 2)zn-3dzdy}
y-v; r-v: ri
(n - 2) I ~ ~y ~pa(n - 1)z"'~dzdy
Jycv; :-v; n
„ r aa 1 ap aa(n - 2) ~(1 - P)a K~fK~-FIí3-v; ll-af nz J-t` n f nz f nz
- n i aal a(i aa
Eo:(~,P)-vt ll-at-Jf-f-(n-1-P) n~ n n~
v~ A~i aa
Ev:(~,P) - n-f- n-F n' (n - 1- P)
aa n(n - 1) a n(n - 1) - 1
1-a}n~ -1- n~-a }n~ n~-a n~
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